There had been well known claims of unconditionally secure quantum protocols for bit commitment. However, we, and independently Mayers, showed that all proposed quantum bit commitment schemes are, in principle, insecure because the sender, Alice, can almost always cheat successfully by using an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) type of attack and delaying her measurements. One might wonder if secure quantum bit commitment protocols exist at all. We answer this question by showing that the same type of attack by Alice will, in principle, break any bit commitment scheme. The cheating strategy generally requires a quantum computer. We emphasize the generality of this "no-go theorem": Unconditionally secure bit commitment schemes based on quantum mechanics-fully quantum, classical or quantum but with measurements-are all ruled out by this result. Since bit commitment is a useful primitive for building up more sophisticated protocols such as zero-knowledge proofs, our results cast very serious doubt on the security of quantum cryptography in the so-called "post-cold-war" applications. We also show that ideal quantum coin tossing is impossible because of the EPR attack. This no-go theorem for ideal quantum coin tossing may help to shed some lights on the possibility of non-ideal protocols.
Introduction
Quantum cryptography was first proposed by Wiesner [28] more than two decades ago in a paper that remained unpublished until 1983. Recently, there have been lots of renewed activities in the subject. The most well-known application of quantum cryptography is key distribution [4, 6, 12] . The aim of key distribution is to allow two users to generate a shared random string of information that can, for example, be used to make their messages in subsequent communication totally unintelligible to an eavesdropper. Quantum key distribution is generally believed to be secure [3, 7, 11, 20, 22] because, it is impossible (for an eavesdropper) to make copies (or clones) of non-orthogonal states in quantum mechanics without violating unitarity. Moreover, measuring a quantum system generally disturbs it because quantum mechanical observables can be non-commuting. For this reason, eavesdropping on a quantum communication channel will generally leave unavoidable disturbance in the transmitted signal which can be detected by the legitimate users. This paper does not concern quantum key distribution. However, it concerns a class of more fancy applications of quantum cryptography that have also been proposed [1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 10] . Those applications are probably more useful in the post-cold-war era. A typical problem in "post-cold-war" quantum cryptography is the two-party secure computation, in which both parties would like to know the result of a computation but neither side wishes to reveal its own data. For example, two firms will embark on a joint venture if and only if their combined capital available for the project is larger than one million dollars. They would like to know if this condition is fulfilled but neither wishes to reveal the exact amount of capital it commits to the project. In classical cryptography, this can be done either through trusted intermediaries or by invoking some unproven computational assumptions such as the hardness of factoring. The big question is whether quantum cryptography can get rid of those requirements and achieve the same goal using the laws of physics alone.
Until recently, there had been much optimism in the subject. Various protocols for say bit commitment, coin tossing and oblivious transfer of quantum cryptography had been proposed [1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 10] . In particular, the BCJL [10] bit commitment scheme had been claimed to be provably unbreakable. It should be noted that bit commitment is a crucial primitive in building up more sophisticated protocols: It has been shown by Yao [29] that a secure quantum bit commitment scheme can be used to implement a secure quantum oblivious transfer scheme whereas Kilian [17] has shown that, in classical cryptography, oblivious transfer can be used to implement secure two-party computations. This chain of arguments, therefore, seems to suggest that quantum bit commitment alone is sufficient for implementing secure two-party computations, thus solving a long standing problem in cryptography. However, this widespread belief in the power of post-cold-war quantum cryptography has recently been seriously challenged by the independent works of ours [18] and of Mayers [21] which showed that, contrary to popular belief, all proposed quantum bit commitment schemes are, in fact, insecure. (The non-ideal case was demonstrated rigorously by Mayers.) This is because the sender, Alice, can always cheat successfully by using an EPR-type of attack and delaying her measurement until she opens her commitment.
The result of Mayers and ours, however, left open the possibility of the existence of some yet unknown secure quantum bit commitment scheme. This paper eliminates this possibility: We show that, provided that a cheater has a quantum computer, unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment is impossible. This is because an EPR-type of attack by at least one of the users can almost always break all bit commitment schemes. We emphasize the generality of this no-go theorem. It applies to any scheme that is consistent with the laws of quantum mechanics. It does not matter whether the scheme is purely quantum, classical or quantum but with measurements.
The reasoning behind its generality is that any two-party quantum computation (possibly with measurements at the intermediate steps) can be rephrased into a fully quantum scheme where measurements are delayed until the very end of the computation. This is chiefly because, by definition, quantum mechanics should provide the most fundamental description of the evolution part of such a computation and, therefore, measurements can be taken into account only at the very end.
More precisely, we explicitly construct a cheating strategy that will allow Alice to cheat successfully against Bob even if Bob has a quantum computer. Now any procedure (including measurements, attachment of ancilla, unitary transformations) followed by Bob can be rephrased into one in which Bob does have a quantum computer but just fails to make full use of it. Therefore, this 'sure-win' strategy will allow Alice to defeat any Bob. Consequently, unconditionally secure bit commitment based on quantum mechanics is impossible.
We also demonstrate the insecurity of ideal quantum coin tossing against the same type of attack.
We acknowledge the receipt of a preprint of Dominic Mayers about the impossibility of quantum bit commitment. This preprint contains the essential result and approach to bit commitment that we present here except that, in our opinion, it does not define in sufficient detail the general model that it uses for quantum protocols and therefore the model is too vague. To answer the question in a more satisfactory manner and to make the discussion more concrete and comprehensive, we strongly feel the need to use a variant of the Yao's model. Besides, such a concrete model is essential for our discussion of the impossibility of ideal quantum coin tossing.
Quantum bit commitment
A general bit commitment scheme involves two parties, a sender Alice and a receiver, Bob. Suppose that Alice has a bit (b = 0 or 1) in mind, to which she would like to be committed towards Bob. That is to say, she wishes to provide Bob with a piece of evidence that she has a bit in mind and that she cannot change it. Meanwhile, Bob should not be able to tell from that evidence what b is. At a later time, however, it must be possible for Alice to open the commitment. That is, Alice must be able to show Bob which bit she has committed to and convinced him that this is indeed the genuine bit that she had in mind when she committed.
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In a simple implementation of bit commitment, Alice writes down her bit in a piece of paper, puts it in a box and locks the box. She then sends the locked box to Bob, but keeps the key. The whole point is that while Bob cannot open the box to learn the value of the bit without the key, Alice cannot change her mind. At a later time, Alice gives the key to Bob, who opens it and verifies the value of the bit. This implementation relies solely on the physical security of the box and is, thus, infeasible in the electronic age.
What constitutes to a cheating by Alice? If Alice commits to a particular value of b (e.g., b = 0) during the commitment phase and attempts to change it to another value (e.g., b = 1) during the opening phase, Alice is cheating. A bit commitment scheme is secure against Alice only if such a fake commitment will be discovered by Bob. In this section, we show that, contrary to popular belief, all quantum bit commitment schemes are, in principle, insecure against a cheating Alice.
Model of two-party quantum protocols
Quantum bit commitment and coin tossing are examples of two-party quantum protocols. A two-party quantum protocol involves a pair of quantum machines in the hands of two users, A (Alice) and B (Bob) respectively, which interact with each other through a quantum channel, C. More formally, we consider the direct product H of the three Hilbert spaces H A , H B and H C where H A (H B ) is the Hilbert space of Alice's (Bob's) machine and H C is the Hilbert space of the channel. We assume that initially each machine is in some specified pure quantum state. A and B then engage in a number of rounds of quantum communications with each other through the channel C. More concretely, each of A and B alternately performs a unitary transformation on H D ⊗ H C where D ∈ {A, B}.
The above model is a simplification of a model proposed by Yao [29] . Although Yao apparently did not emphasize the generality of his model, it appears to us that any realistic two-party computation can be described by Yao's model. For instance, since Alice and Bob are separated by a long distance, it is impractical to demand simultaneous two-way communications between them. 4 The idea of alternate rounds of one-way communications in Yao's model is, therefore, reasonable. However, there are two significant distinctions between Yao's model and ours. First, Yao's model deals with mixed initial states whereas we assume that the initial state of each machine is pure. Second, in Yao's model, the user D does two things in each round of the communication: D carries out a measurement on the current mixed state of the portion of the space, H D ⊗ H C , in his/her control and then performs a unitary transformation on H D ⊗ H C . In our model, the measurement step has been eliminated.
Here we argue that our simplifications are desirable for our current analysis. Let us consider the first distinction. In assuming that the initial state of each machine is pure, we are just giving the users complete control over the initial states of the machines. Any situation with mixed initial state can be included in our consideration simply by attaching a quantum dice to a machine and considering the pure state as describing the combined state of the two.
What about the second distinction? Essentially, we give Alice and Bob quantum computers and quantum storage devices. Therefore, they can execute a quantum bit commitment scheme by unitary transformations.
The key observation
The reader may still wonder about the role of measurement. Does it mean that one should follow all possible histories of the outcomes and consider decoherence? Is our proof really general? We argue that our proof is general. The key insight is the following: To show that all bit commitment schemes (classical, quantum or quantum but with some measurements) are insecure, it suffices to consider only a fully quantum bit commitment scheme where both Alice and Bob have quantum computers. This is because any other procedure followed by Bob in a bit commitment scheme can be rephrased as a quantum bit commitment scheme where Bob does have a quantum computer but just fails to make full use of it. Now, since we will show that Alice has a winning strategy against Bob even if he makes full use of his quantum computer, it is clear that this "sure-win" strategy by Alice will defeat a Bob who fails to make full use of his quantum computer. Therefore, the insecurity of a fully quantum bit commitment scheme automatically implies the insecurity of all bit commitment schemes (purely quantum, classical or quantum scheme but with measurements).
The above remark -that it is unnecessary to consider decoherence and measurements -applies also to our discussion of ideal coin tossing. Such a unitary description will greatly simplify our discussion. 5 
Procedure of quantum bit commitment
The most general procedure for a quantum bit commitment scheme can be rephrased in the following unitary description.
(a) Preparation of states: Alice chooses the value of a bit b to which she would like to be committed towards Bob. If b = 0 (respectively b = 1), she prepares a state |0 (respectively |1 ) for H A . Bob prepares a state |BC for the product Hilbert space H B ⊗ H C . All the states |0 , |1 and |BC are specified by the protocol and are known to both Alice and Bob. Notice that for an ideal bit commitment, it must be the case that, at the end of step (b), Bob still has absolutely no information about the value of the committed bit b. (We will relax this assumption when we come to the nonideal case in the next subsection.) Now that the commitment has been made, both sides may wait an arbitrary length of time until the last step: 
In a secure bit commitment scheme, Bob will learn the value of b and be convinced that Alice has already committed to that value of b at the end of step (b) and cannot change it anymore in step (c).
In what follows, we argue that the above general scheme necessarily fails because Alice can always cheat successfully by using reversible unitary operations in step (b) and subsequently rotating a state that corresponds to b = 0 to one that corresponds to b = 1 and vice versa in the beginning of step (c). Note that, for Alice to cheat, she generally needs a quantum computer to perform the desirable unitary transformation.
Let us justify our claim. Consider more closely the situation at the end of step (b), the commitment phase. Let |0 com and |1 com denote the state of H = H A ⊗ H B ⊗ H C at that time corresponding to the two possible values of b respectively. In order that Alice and Bob can follow the procedures, they must know the exact forms of all the unitary transformations involved.
6 Therefore, Alice must be capable of computing the two states |0 com and |1 com .
To simplify our analysis, we give the channel to whoever controlling it. Therefore, it suffices to consider a two-party state in H A ⊗ H B . Now, the fact that Bob has absolutely no information about the value of b implies that ideally the density matrix in his hand is independent of the value of b. That is to say that Tr A (|0 com 0| com ) = Tr A (|1 com 1| com ). But then |0 com and |1 com of H must have the same Schmidt decomposition (See for example, the Appendix of Ref. [15] .), namely:
and
where |e k A and |e k ′ A are two orthonormal bases of H A and |φ k B is an orthonormal basis of H B . Notice that λ k and |φ k B are the same in the above two equations and that the only difference lies in Alice system (|e k A as opposed to |e k ′ A ). The key observation is that these two states are related by a unitary transformation acting on H A alone! Consequently, Alice can make a fake commitment and change the value of b in the beginning of step (c).
For example, she may proceed as follows: First, Alice always takes b = 0 in step (a) and goes through step (b), the commit phase. It is only in the beginning of step (c), the opening phase, that Alice decides on the actual value of b that she wishes to open. If she decides b = 0 now, she can go through step (c) honestly. If she wishes to change the value of b from 0 to 1, she simply applies a unitary transformation (|e k A → |e k ′ A ) to rotate the state from |0 com to |1 com before going through step (c). Since the unitary transformation acts on H A alone, Alice can apply it without Bob's help. Moreover, Bob clearly has no way of knowing Alice's cheating. 7 In conclusion, provided that Alice possesses quantum computers and quantum storage devices, our results show that all quantum bit commitment schemes are insecure because Alice can cheat successfully by using an EPR-type of attack.
As remarked in the last subsection, this no-go theorem applies to all bit commitment schemes-purely quantum, classical or quantum but with classical measurements. This is because any procedure of quantum bit commitment scheme can be regarded as a scheme in which Bob does have a quantum computer but fails to make full use of it. By showing that Alice can cheat successfully even if Bob makes full use of his quantum computer, we break all bit commitment scheme-purely quantum, classical or quantum but with classical measurements.
Non-ideal bit commitment
In our above discussion, we have assumed that the bit commitment scheme is ideal in the sense that Bob has absolutely no information about the value of b at the end of step (b). This is the physical reason behind the mathematical statement that ρ com 0
e., the two density matrices corresponding to the two cases b = 0 and b = 1 are identical.) However, in realistic applications, one might allow Bob to have a very tiny amount of information about b at that time. It is intuitively plausible that this is not going to change our conclusion. On the one hand, if Bob has a large probability of distinguishing between the two states corresponding to b = 0 and b = 1 at the end of step (b), the scheme is inherently unsafe against Bob. On the other hand, if Bob has a small probability of distinguishing between the two states, then clearly, the density matrices ρ com 0 = Tr A (|0 com 0| com ) and ρ com 1 = Tr A (|1 com 1| com ) must be close to each other in some sense. We have seen in the last subsection that when the two density matrices are identical, Alice can always cheat successfully. It is, therefore, at least highly suggestive that, when the two density matrices are only slightly different, Alice will have a probability close to 1 of cheating successfully. The analysis in the next subsection shows that this is indeed the case. Therefore, even non-ideal bit commitment schemes are necessarily highly insecure. 7 What is the problem with quantum bit commitment? Here is an analogy. Suppose that there are two novels whose first halves are the same, but the second halves are different. I give you only the first half of one of the two novels and I tell you that I have committed to a particular novel and that I cannot change it anymore. Will you trust me? Of course not. Since the first halves of the two novels are the same, no real commitment has been made. I am free to give you the second half of either novel and claim that I have committed to either one all along. There is no way for you to tell whether I am lying.
Fidelity
In this subsection, following Mayers [21] , we sketch the mathematical proof of the insecurity of non-ideal quantum bit commitment scheme. Readers who are uninterested in mathematical details may skip this subsection on first reading. The price that they have to pay is to take Eqs. (6) and (8) for granted.
First of all, the closeness between two density matrices ρ 0 and ρ 1 of a system B can be described by fidelity [13, 14, 16] , which is defined as
0 ≤ F ≤ 1. F = 1 if and only if ρ 0 = ρ 1 . Returning to the case of non-ideal bit commitment that we have been considering, the fact that Bob has a small probability for distinguishing between two states ρ 
where δ is small.
An alternative and equivalent definition of fidelity involves the concept of purification. Imagine another system E attached to our given system B. There are many pure states |ψ 0 and |ψ 1 on the composite system such that
The pure states |ψ 0 and |ψ 1 are called the purifications of the density matrices ρ 0 and ρ 1 . The fidelity can be defined as
where the maximization is over all possible purifications.
Here are two useful remarks. Firstly, for any fixed purification of ρ 1 , there exists a maximally parallel purification of ρ 0 satisfying Eq. (6). 8 Secondly, given any two purifications of ρ 0 , there exists a local unitary transformation which rotates one into the other.
Let us go back to a non-ideal quantum bit commitment scheme. We take E to be Alice's machine A. Using the first remark, we find from Eqs. (4) and (6) that, for the state |1 com which is a purification of ρ com 1 , there exist a purification |ψ 0 AB of ρ com 0 such that
The strategy of a cheating Alice is the same as in the ideal case. She always prepares the state |0 corresponding to b = 0 in step (a) and goes through step (b). She decides on the value of b she likes only in the beginning of the step (c). If she chooses b = 0, of course, she can just follow the rule. If she chooses b = 1, she applies a unitary transformation to obtain the state |ψ 0 AB in H = H A ⊗H B . The existence of such a unitary transformation is guaranteed by the second remark. After this unitary transformation, she can continue to execute step (c) of the protocol for b = 1, pretending that the total state is |1 com .
If she had been honest, the state would have been |1 com instead. Since |ψ 0 AB and |1 com are so similar to each other (See Eq. (7).), Bob clearly has a hard time in detecting the dishonesty of Alice. Therefore, Alice can cheat successfully with a very large probability.
Yet another equivalent definition of the fidelity, which will be useful in the next section, can be given in terms of positive-operator-valued-measures (POVMs). A POVM is a set {Ê b } of positive operators (i.e., Hermitian operators with non-negative eigenvalues) that satisfy a sort of completeness relation (i.e., bÊb equals the identity operator). A POVM simply represents the most general measurement that can be performed on a system. More concretely, it is implemented by a) placing the system in contact with an auxiliary system or ancilla prepared in a standard state, b) evolving the two by a unitary operator, and c) performing an ordinary von Neumann measurement on the ancilla. In terms of POVMs, the fidelity is defined as
where the minimization is over all POVMs, {Ê b }. Eq. (8) will be useful in the next section.
Quantum coin tossing
Suppose that Alice and Bob are having a divorce and that they are living far away from each other. They would like to decide by a coin flip over the telephone who is going to keep the house. Of course, if one of them is tossing a real coin, there is no way for the other to tell if he/she is cheating. Therefore, there must be something else that is simulating the coin flip. Just like bit commitment, coin tossing can be done in classical cryptography either through trusted intermediaries or by accepting some unproven computational assumptions. The question is: Can quantum mechanics help to remove those requirements? In other words, do coin tossing schemes whose security is based solely on the law of quantum physics exist?
Notice that a secure bit commitment protocol can be used trivially to implement a secure coin tossing protocol 9 but the converse is not true. Coin tossing is a weaker protocol for which we have a weaker result-ideal quantum coin tossing schemes do not exist. We define an ideal coin tossing scheme as one that satisfies the following requirements: 2) Both users know which outcome occurs.
3) If the outcomes '0' or '1' occur, Alice and Bob can be sure that they occur with precisely the (non-zero) probabilities, say 1/2 each, prescribed by the protocol. 4) If both users are honest, the outcome 'invalid' will never occur.
In other words, in an ideal coin tossing scheme, both parties will always agree with each other on the outcome. There is no room for dispute. Also, cheating in an ideal coin tossing will only lead to a non-vanishing probability for the occurrence of 'invalid' as an outcome, but will not change the relative probability of occurrence of '0' and '1'. Most coin tossing schemes are non-ideal. However, any non-ideal quantum coin tossing scheme can be regarded as an approximation to an ideal scheme. Investigations of the ideal scheme may, therefore, shed some lights on those more realistic, but non-ideal, ones.
Of course, if one allows Alice and Bob to share initially some known entangled state, for example, a singlet, they can trivially achieve quantum coin tossing. The problem is, however, that there is no way for Alice and Bob to verify that, indeed, they share such a state. If such a state is prepared by a trusted third party, the scheme is no longer a two-party protocol. If such a state is prepared by one of the two parties, he or she may cheat. Therefore, one should always 9 Alice chooses a bit and commits it to Bob. Bob simply tells Alice his guess for her bit. Alice then opens her commitment to see if Bob has guessed correctly. 10 We gratefully thank Goldenberg and Mayers for many discussions which are very helpful for sharpening and clarifying our ideas.
assume that initially Alice and Bob share no entanglement.
To show that ideal quantum coin tossing is impossible, we first prove the following Lemma.
Lemma: Given that Alice and Bob initially share no entangled quantum states, they cannot achieve ideal quantum coin tossing without any further communication between each other.
Proof: An ideal coin tossing scheme will give Alice and Bob non-zero mutual information. However, without prior classical communication, the maximal amount of mutual information that can be gained by Alice and Bob through local operations on shared entangled quantum states is bounded by the entropy of formation. In the absence of entanglement, they cannot share any mutual information. Hence, coin tossing without prior communication nor shared entangled quantum states must be impossible. Now we come to the main theorem.
Theorem: Given that Alice and Bob initially share no entangled quantum states, ideal quantum coin tossing is impossible.
Proof: The idea of our proof is simple. We prove by contradiction using backward induction. Let us assume that an ideal quantum coin tossing can be done with a fixed and finite number, N, rounds of communication between Alice and Bob. We will prove that it can be done in N − 1 rounds. By repeated induction, it can be done without any communication between Alice and Bob at all. This is impossible because of the above Lemma. The induction step from N rounds to N − 1 rounds: Suppose that there exists an ideal quantum coin tossing protocol which involves N alternate rounds of communication between Alice and Bob. We need to prove that an ideal quantum coin tossing protocol with only N − 1 rounds exists. Let us concentrate on the N-th round of the communication. Without much loss of generality, assume that it is Alice's turn to send quantum signals through the channel C in the N-th round. As this is the last round, by the definition of ideal coin tossing, Alice can perform a measurement and determine the outcome, 0, 1 or 'invalid', before sending out the last round signals to Bob. Notice that Alice should have no objection against eliminating the N-th round altogether because she has nothing to gain in sending the last round signals (other than convincing Bob of the outcome). On the other hand, Bob is supposed to learn the outcome of the coin tossing through the combined state in H B ⊗H C . However, Alice, who has already known the outcome herself, may attempt to alter Bob's outcome by changing the mixed state in H C that she is sending through the channel. This is essentially the same strategy of cheating as in the case of quantum bit commitment discussed earlier. . Here for simplicity, we assume that there is a single pure state corresponding to the outcome 'invalid'. However, our arguments are general. For ideal quantum coin tossing, we demand the probability of Alice cheating successfully should be exactly zero. This implies, with the definition of fidelity in Eq. (6) , that F (ρ Hence, even Bob has nothing to gain from the last round of communication. A truncated ideal coin tossing scheme with only N − 1 rounds of communication must, therefore, be as secure as the original N-round scheme. This completes our inductive argument and we conclude that ideal quantum coin tossing is impossible. As noted in subsection 2.2, this "no-go" theorem applies to all ideal coin tossing scheme including purely quantum, purely classical and quantum but with classical measurements.
Unlike quantum bit commitment, for quantum coin tossing, there is no simple way to generalize our proof of the impossibility of the ideal scheme to the nonideal ones. This is surprising because no such distinction has been previously noted in the literature. As far as we know, all previously proposed quantum coin tossing schemes are based on quantum bit commitment schemes. The security of non-ideal quantum coin tossing should be an important subject for future investigations. We hope that our investigation for the ideal case will shed light on the subtleties in the non-ideal case.
A constraint on two-party secure computation
Let us consider the issue of two-party secure computation in a more general setting. The idea of two-party secure computation is the following: Alice has a secret x and Bob has another secret y. Both would like to know the result f (x, y) at the end of a computation and be sure that the result is correct. However, neither side wishes the other side to learn more about its own secret than what can be deduced from the output f (x, y). As mentioned earlier, classical cryptographic schemes can implement two-party secure computation at the cost of introducing trusted intermediaries or accepting unproven cryptographic assumptions. Our results in the last two sections strongly suggest that, in principle at least, quantum cryptography would not be useful for getting rid of those requirements in two-party secure computation. Even if quantum mechanics does not help, one may ask if there is any way of implementing a two-party computation that is secure from an information-theoretic point of view? In particular, if quantum mechanics turned out to be wrong and were replaced by a new physical theory, would it be conceivable that two-party secure computation can be done in this new theory? Here we argue that if Alice and Bob are shameless enough to declare their dishonesty and stop the computation whenever one of them has a slightest advantage over the other in the amount of mutual information he/she has on the function f (x, y), a two-party secure computation can never be implemented.
For simplicity, let us normalize everything and assume that initially both Alice and Bob have no information about f (x, y) and at the end of the computation, both have 1 bit of information about f (x, y). Let us suppose further than Alice and Bob are unkind enough to stop the computation whenever one of them has an ǫ bit of information more than the other. Any realistic scheme must involve a finite number say N alternate rounds of communication between Alice and Bob. An analogy is that two persons, Alice and Bob, are walking in discrete alternate steps from the starting point 0 to the finishing line set at 1. Altogether N steps are made and it is demanded that Alice and Bob will never be separated from each other for more than a distance ǫ.
11 Clearly, this implies Nǫ ≥ 1 or N ≥ 1/ǫ. Therefore, the smaller the tolerable relative informational advantage ǫ is, the larger the number of rounds of communication N is needed. Notice that the constraint Nǫ ≥ 1 applies to any two-party secure computation scheme. In particular, it remains valid even if quantum mechanics is wrong.
It may also be of some interest to speculate that a similar inequality Nǫ ≥ 0(1) may hold for non-ideal quantum coin tossing schemes where N is the number of rounds of communication and ǫ is the probability that a user cheats successfully. Consequently, as ǫ → 0, N → ∞ and ideal quantum coin tossing with finite rounds of communication becomes impossible.
Summary
We have proven a no-go theorem for unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment. We emphasize its generality. This result applies to all bit commitment schemes-fully quantum, classical or quantum but with measurements. The basic problem is that the users can cheat using entanglement to per-form an EPR-type of attack. This attack is a re-incarnation of the famous Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox. While this basic attack was well-known, its generality was not widely appreciated until recently [21, 18] .
Our simple proof of the no-go theorem uses a unitary description of the execution of the protocol. The point is the following: quantum mechanics must provide the simplest and most fundamental description of any protocol based on quantum physics. In particular, there is no need to give measurements and classical communications in the intermediate steps any special treatment. Indeed, we argue that by including all the ancillas' states into consideration and considering the quantum mechanics for the enlarged system, one can describe any quantum cryptographic protocol in a simple unitary setting. Put it another way: Any procedure followed by Bob is equivalent to the situation when Bob has a quantum computer but fails to make full use of it. Therefore, by showing that Alice can cheat almost always successfully against Bob even if Bob makes full use of his quantum computer, it is clear that this 'sure-win' strategy will defeat any strategy followed by Bob. Consequently, quantum bit commitment is impossible.
Our results totally contradict well-known claims of unconditionally secure schemes in the literature, whose analyses on EPR attack were flawed, and provide strong evidence against the security of quantum cryptography in "postcold-war" applications, at least in principle. The early optimism in the subject is, therefore, misplaced. Nevertheless, quantum bit commitment schemes that are secure in practice may still exist 12 because it is notoriously difficult for cheaters with current technology to store quantum signals for an arbitrary length of time. (This can, in principle, be overcome by quantum error correction [25, 27] which lengthens the decoherence time to arbitrarily long.) A more serious consideration is the following. In order to cheat successfully, a cheater generally needs a quantum computer, but such a computer is not yet available with current technology. (Errors in quantum computing can, in principle, be surmounted if a cheater performs quantum computation in a fault tolerant [26, 24] manner.) Therefore, we can trade the classical computational complexity assumptions with quantum computational complexity assumptions. This subject deserves further investigations.
Notice also that while quantum computers can crack conventional cryptography retrospectively, they cannot do so against quantum cryptography. In this aspect, before a fully operating quantum computer is built, quantum cryptography does have an advantage over conventional cryptography.
An important unsolved problem is the powers and limitations of quantum cryptography. For example, is non-ideal quantum coin tossing possible? How secure is quantum money? Finally, we remark that, thanks to the quantum "no-cloning" theorem, the security of quantum key distribution [7, 11, 20, 22] is widely accepted and quantum cryptography is useful at least for this purpose. We expect quantum key distribution to remain a fertile subject for years to come.
Notes added: The impossibility of quantum bit commitment has also been demonstrated by Mayers [23] . One of us (H.-K. L) has recently proven two new no-go theorems for other quantum cryptographic schemes, namely quantum "one-out-of-two oblivious transfer" and quantum "one-sided" two-party secure computations [19] . There is also a survey paper on the insecurity of quantum cryptographic schemes [9] by us.
